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Before the rise of neo-conservative economics, much of the water, 
electricity, gas, telephone and public transport infrastructure 
around the world was built by states in the name of nation build-
ing. Governments owned and operated the utilities to build their 
economies and improve the quality of life for all classes of people. 
Governments decided how they managed the infrastructure, 
charged for its use, and employed the people to build and main-
tain the networks. The policies they implemented were in the pub-
lic domain. The extent to which utilities were efficient, effective 
and in the public interest was a public matter, and governments 
were accountable to the electorate for their successes or failures.
In recent decades a wave of privatisation has swept across the 
developed world and washed many of these utilities into the 
hands of international corporations. Theoretical assumptions about 
efficiency, market discipline and competitive pricing have driven 
the reform agenda but with the benefit of hindsight, evidence now 
suggests that in a number of cases, deregulation has failed to live 
up to expectations (Batstone 2000, Kraus 2005).
Publicly elected governments can no longer determine the man-
agement and pricing of privatised utilities by dint of their direct 
ownership. Where this control still exists it does so in the form of 
regulation. Regulations governing provision of utilities usually exist 
outside the battery of competition and anti-trust laws found in 
developed countries, and applies specifically to the industries con-
cerned. Regulation of the energy sector can govern the structural 
aspects of the market such as geographic coverage, entry or exit of 
operators, licences, or limitations on vertical integration between 
generation and retail. Regulation can also govern operations such 
as price controls, disconnections and minimum service standards 
(Kraus 2005).
Now that private ownership of public utilities is an accepted norm, 
the contest between a laissez-faire approach and state control has 
narrowed to the field of regulation. Despite a low level of popular 
engagement with the setting of these regulations, the regulatory 
framework governing utility provision can have far reaching conse-
quences for the economy, the environment, social equity and qual-
ity of life. The regulatory process involves many vested interests 
and conflicting points of view. With deep pockets and interna-
tional scope, many utility owners are well placed to influence the 
regulatory decisions of government, particularly where the interests 
of a number of owners coincide. Sometimes regulations can tie the 
hands of the larger incumbent operators in order to level the play-
ing field for smaller companies and new entrants. Thus preferences 
for regulatory reform can differ within the private sector. Consum-
ers, too can voice their interests, particularly through advocacy 
groups and the community sector. The consumer’s voice is not 
unanimous though as different priorities will emerge with different 
lifestyles, values, geographic locations and economic conditions. A 
complex web of vested interests emerges in the regulatory process 
and it is up to governments to decide where the public interest 
lies.
There is a school of thought that contends that the presence of 
effective competition is a sufficient reason for deregulation. It 
argues that competitive discipline will be enough to protect the 
public interest, and that the inefficiencies and distortions caused 
by regulations reduce the performance of market operators for their 
customers, investors and the economy as a whole. We might call 
this position the ‘competitive discipline view’.
There is another view that regulatory structures can be appropriate 
mechanisms for protecting the public good in a range of differ-
ent ways. This view argues that regulations should be evaluated 
against their expected impacts, positive and negative, rather than 
evaluated only by the presence or absence of effective competition. 
We might call this position the ‘effective regulation view’.
This article explores some of these regulatory questions in the 
context of the Victorian retail energy market. It considers some of 
the positions taken by the Australian Energy Market Commission 
(AEMC) in their advocacy of full price deregulation and assesses 
them against a system of regulatory principles developed by Kraus 
(2005).
Deregulation and Competition in the Victorian 
Retail Energy Market
The provision of energy (electricity and gas) to households in-
volves generation, distribution and retail. Each of these realms con-
stitutes a discrete area of regulation, policy and market structure. 
The retail function itself is primarily: procurement of energy, meter 
reading, billing and collection of payment (Salies & Waddams 
Price 2004). The Victorian retail market prior to 1st January 2009 
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was regulated by price control agreements between host retailers 
and government. Through an amendment to the Electricity Act, 
the Victorian Parliament removed tariff regulations for standing 
offers from 1 January 2009.
There are 13 energy retailers in Victoria, including three host retail-
ers (also referred to as first tier retailers), who retail to a substantial 
majority of consumers in Victoria and for whom regulated tariffs 
were set. The other retailers (referred to as second tier retailers) 
offer market contracts, generally at a rate discounted from the set 
tariff and have collectively built up a nearly 20% share of the retail 
energy market (AEMC 2007a).
During the initial stage of the privatisation and deregulation of 
energy markets in Victoria, price regulation was introduced as ‘a 
transitional measure until an effectively competitive retail market 
had developed’ (Victorian Hansard from 2000 cited in AEMC 
2007a:45). This position accords with the ‘competitive discipline 
view’ as outlined above. After a process of privatisation, full retail 
competition was introduced in Victorian energy markets in 2002. 
The Australian Energy Market Commission, in accordance with 
the terms of the Australian Energy Market Agreement and the 
request for advice from the Ministerial Council on Energy, reviewed 
the effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retailing in 
Victoria. In accordance with the ‘competitive discipline view’, com-
petition was found to be effective, and the Commission to provide 
advice to the Victorian Government and the Ministerial Council 
on Energy on ways to phase out retail price regulation. The AEMC 
produced two reports in its Review of the effectiveness of competi-
tion in electricity and gas retail markets in Victoria. These reports 
found competition to be effective and proposed a number of 
measures to remove the price regulations.
In order to better establish the arguments for or against regulation 
in this area, a brief discussion of some established policy principles 
for the use of regulation follows.
Regulation and Energy Retail
Regulation has been defined as the use of a government’s power 
to coerce for the purpose of restricting the decisions of economic 
agents (Viscusi et al 2000). Intervention on behalf of consumers 
will be justified if the benefits to consumers outweigh the associ-
ated administrative, enforcement and compliance costs associated 
with the intervention (Smith 2000). Direct regulation may be 
appropriate where the government is desirous of achieving some 
social objective or where competition is absent or weak and is 
unlikely, at least for some time, to develop (Smith 1998).
Kraus (2005) lists a number of reasons for regulation:
economies of scale and natural monopoly (long-run 
average cost declining as firm size increases);
•
excessive competition, external economies (consump-
tion or production activities affecting the cost/benefit 
function of other economic units positively or nega-
tively);
information asymmetry (principle-agent situation);
public goods (collective consumption goods versus pure 
or impure goods), trade-cycles;
protection of infant industries (e.g. administered renew-
able energy markets);
bounded rationality;
moral hazard (agents act in ways that incur costs which 
they do not have to bear);
co-ordination problems;
transaction cost (to the extent consumers or producers 
incur costs for information about market opportunities, 
markets will not perform efficiently).
We will use this system of regulatory principles to evaluate the 
likely impact of price deregulation in the Victorian energy market.
Bounded Rationality – Choice and 
Comparison
In this case the good or service is electricity retail. It is uniform 
and without distinguishing characteristics from one supplier 
to another. Competition between suppliers is limited to price, 
contract conditions, non-price benefits and marketing rather that 
the product itself. Given this homogeneity of product, consumers 
tend to view electricity as a ‘low involvement commodity’ and are 
not inclined to undertake market searches to find superior price or 
service offers (AEMC 2007a).
The AEMC’s First Draft Report finds that as the perceived search 
and switching costs tend to outweigh the perceived benefits avail-
able to switchers, retail customers tend not to seek out information 
about competing contracts and exhibit a status-quo bias. In this 
environment, retailers focus their attention on ‘direct marketing’ 
with door to door sales and promotions offering the most effective 
technique for retailers to persuade consumers to sign over their 
contracts (AEMC 2007a).
Regulations do not prevent retailers from marketing their products 
with reference to other market contracts, or with a complex array 
of set and variable costs which may better fit the needs of some 
consumers (AEMC 2007a). Nevertheless standing offers are an 
important reference point. One retailer quoted in a survey of retail-
ers stated:
‘We’ve seen customers turn away from us on the basis that 
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cost…it’s the standing offers on the base level tariffs that 
are creating that effect in the market’ (second tier retailer). 
(Wallis Consulting 2007:15)
Energy markets in the U.S. with similar structures of fixed prices 
for incumbents and market prices for new entrants show that the 
regulations have a similar standardising effect across all retailers 
(Bushnell et al 2007). It is here that retail price regulation emerges 
as an important factor in consumer behaviour. The AEMC report 
finds that the regulated price, or ‘standing offer’ previously pro-
vided a benchmark for both the level and structure of retail price 
offers (AEMC 2007a).
[R]etailers have continued to price by reference to the 
standing offer, primarily because it allows for some simple 
comparisons to be made in an environment where customers 
want information that is easy to understand. (AEMC 
2007a:51)
Direct marketing and easy to understand price comparisons are 
likely to motivate some customers to switch retailers. The AE-
MC’s First Draft Report (2007a) used international comparisons 
to establish that the Victorian market was ‘hot’, with 20%-26% 
switching rates prior to deregulation, with Victoria occupying the 
highest category of customer switching internationally, with most 
other markets considered ‘dormant’. The AEMC’s First Draft Report 
(2007a) does not consider the effect of set-price tariff benchmarks 
in the success of the Victorian market, nor compare the success of 
other markets with respect to price regulation.
Information Asymmetry - Consumer Protection
Effective competition does not in and of itself protect consumers 
from the exercise of market power by incumbent retailers. Articu-
lating this point, Rhonda Smith, an influential Australian policy 
maker in the area of consumer protection1, says:
Consumer protection issues are often assumed only to arise 
in markets characterised by limited competition. In such 
markets, consumers have little or no choice of supplier and 
so have limited bargaining power. However, the intense 
rivalry in markets characterised as highly competitive may 
also give rise to competition issues, albeit of a somewhat 
different nature. (Smith 2000:411)
One of Kraus’ reasons for regulation is information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry can allow market power to be exercised by 
incumbent retailers against their rivals and consumers, despite the 
presence of effective competition. Smith elaborates:
[R]ather than market structure, it is the nature of goods and 
services and the cost of obtaining and processing information 
that may place consumers in a poor bargaining position. 
(Smith 2000:408)
In a deregulated environment, retailers clearly intend to change the 
way they structure their products. One first tier retailer quoted in 
the consultants’ survey noted:
We expect that as the market further matures and as 
regulation in respect of market contracts is reduced, there 
will be significant product innovation. (Wallis Consulting 
2007:16)
As innovation develops across the market, increasing complexity is 
likely to emerge, with implications for greater information asymme-
try. On the other hand, market offers presented in reference to the 
set price tariff allow consumers a clear, low search-cost mechanism 
for price comparison.
Without this benchmark, the cost to consumers of searching 
for, comparing and comprehending the various offers is likely to 
increase, particularly for those customers without the resources to 
allow them to do so efficiently, such as an internet connection, 
and literacy and numeracy skills. As the search cost increases, so 
will the disincentive to seek out better offers and switch retailers. 
Accordingly, retailers may increase prices to current customers 
confident that the likelihood of their switching to another retailer 
is reduced. This dynamic leads to an increase in market power of 
incumbent retailers. Defining market power, Smith says:
Market power may be defined as the ability to ‘give less and 
charge more’. It refers to a situation where a firm (or group 
of firms acting jointly) has discretion in its decision making 
because it is free from constraints imposed by competition. 
(Smith 1998:17)
The AEMC’s First Draft Report (2007a) acknowledges the impor-
tance of consumer information on price restraint:
The exercise of informed customer choice among competing 
suppliers and their products and services… constrains the 
behaviour of retailers as they strive to retain customer 
patronage and increase their share of the total number of 
customers. (AEMC 2007a:23)
Yet it does not consider the effects of removing the price regulation 
on customers seeking to inform themselves.
One important tool for effective and easy comparison of differ-
ing market offers are online comparator services. Internet ISP 
customers, for example, are well served in Australia by the www.
whirlpool.net.au website providing comprehensive information on 
various internet services with comparisons on price, benefits and 
conditions, along with extensive reviews and discussions from us-
ers. The retail energy market would be well served by such a serv-
ice, but the AEMC suggests in their Second Draft Report (2007b) 
that developments in this area have stalled because retailers are 
reluctant to provide information enabling comparison.
The First Draft Report (AEMC 2007a) acknowledges that the ra-
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tionality of an informed consumer is vital to a healthy competitive 
environment:
The extent to which customers are willing to participate 
by actively making decisions about their energy supply 
arrangements will also depend on the presence or magnitude 
of search and switching costs relative to the benefits available 
from changing retailer. (AEMC 2007a:85)
However, the First Draft Report (AEMC 2007a) seems blind to 
the possibility that removing the set-price tariffs will dampen the 
market by increasing the search and switching costs for consum-
ers. It failed to consider consumer information within its criteria 
for assessing the effectiveness of competition (AEMC 2007a) or in 
its analysis of effective competition (AEMC 2007a). Den Hertog 
(2003) specifically lists such transaction costs as a market failure 
justifying government regulation. This type of ‘ex-ante’ regulation 
applies in most European states (see Kraus 2005).
From the consumer protection perspective, at least two of Kraus’ 
justifications for regulation are present: transaction costs and infor-
mation asymmetry.
Public Goods - Social Equity
Electricity is an essential service. The lighting, cooking, heating 
and hot water we enjoy from electricity are associated with a de-
cent, minimum standard of living (Dufty 2007). Research indicates 
that pensioners consume energy at a rate below average household 
consumption, but as a proportion of income, they consume at 
almost double the rate of average households (Dufty 2007:63).
If deregulation of set price tariffs can be shown to affect lower 
income groups disproportionately, then they can be said to reduce 
social equity in this sector and in the Victorian economy generally.
Research and commentary on the social equity implications of 
energy deregulation has been extensive in the UK. Having travelled 
down the road of privatisation and deregulation of energy utilities 
further and earlier than Australia, experiences in the UK can be 
useful to understand the likely outcomes of further deregulation in 
Victoria.
UK Comparison
The household retail part of energy markets was first opened to 
competition in the UK in 1998. After a process of progressive 
introduction, full price competition in all sectors of the market 
applied from April 2002 (Salies & Waddams Price 2004). In the 
aftermath of liberalisation, critics have argued that customers with 
lower incomes fared worse in the new system (Otero & Waddams 
Price 2001, Green 2005).
Unlike the Victorian energy markets, energy retail in the UK 
provides for three different payment methods; standard credit 
(payment in arrears after receipt of a quarterly bill); direct debit 
(monthly amounts deducted from a customer’s bank account); 
and prepayment, where supply is activated by insertion in the 
meter of a precharged ‘smart card’ or key (Salies & Waddams 
Price 2004). In 1998, 15% of UK energy consumers used prepay-
ment meters and about half of these received welfare entitlements 
(Ofgem 1998). Customers unable to pay initial security deposits for 
standard credit or direct debits, or those who have been unable to 
pay previous debts accrued to retailers have little choice but to use 
this system, while some customers choose prepayments as a way 
of budgeting.
The performance of the market in the prepayment sector is indica-
tive of how it impacts on disadvantaged people. The increased cost 
of metering and retailing the smart cards was reflected in higher 
tariffs prior to deregulation. Thus a continued premium for this 
product is not necessarily evidence of poor market performance. 
A study by Salies and Waddams Price nevertheless found that the 
prepayment market was ‘much further from being competitive than 
for the other two payment methods’, that ‘there is more general 
market power in the prepayment market, where marketing is less 
aggressive and fewer consumers have switched [supplier]’, ‘the 
markets are effectively bifurcated, with some consumers resistant 
to switching, so the incumbent mark-up indicates exploitation of 
market power for these non switchers. This raises distributional 
concerns insofar as this part of the market generally has lower 
income than those who switch’ (2004:31). The trend towards 
lower competition for prepayers has continued. In the most recent 
figures available, the switching rates for gas and electricity supplier 
were respectively 10% and 5% less than average customers (Ofgem 
2005:7). The lower rate of switching, and corresponding lower 
rate of competition, is reflected in a slightly increased difference 
between average prices for prepayment and other payment options 
between 1999 and 2005 (Ofgem 2005). Social equity in energy 
provision has decreased with privatisation in the UK.
Inequity in Access to Information
An economics study by Posen and Puhakka posits ‘two different 
classes of people coexisiting in an economy – those for whom 
information is costless to gather and process, and those less able 
to gather and process the information’ (1997:232). It is the latter 
group who are least able to afford rising energy costs and least 
able to negotiate the increasing complexity of tariff innovation. 
It is this cohort who will be most vulnerable to exploitation by 
incumbent retailers.
Cross Subsidies or Cost Reflective Pricing?
Apart from the lack of competition for the lower income and con-
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sumption market, deregulation is likely to further afflict those on 
low incomes as a result of a move towards ‘cost reflective pricing’. 
Retailing energy incurs certain fixed costs, regardless of energy 
use – meter reading, billing and collection of payment. Where the 
energy consumption of the household is higher, the bill is larger 
and the fixed cost is a correspondingly lower proportion of overall 
costs incurred by the retailer. Households with higher energy 
consumption are therefore more profitable for retailers, and lower 
consumption households less so. It is in this sense that a fixed 
tariff for all households results in an effective cross subsidy from 
high consumption households to low consumption households. 
Electricity is a normal good in the sense that as income increases, 
so does consumption (Dufty 2007). In this sense, a regulated price 
benefits social equity in general by high income earners subsiding 
low income earners. Under deregulation, this situation is likely to 
be replaced with a move to ‘cost reflective pricing’, a view sup-
ported by a submission made by the Energy Retailers Association 
of Australia (ERAA), in response to an Issues Paper released by the 
AEMC on 1 June 2007.
It is our view that the most significant issue that stifles 
competition and innovation in the Victorian market is 
the maintenance of retail prices, which effectively inhibits 
competition by introducing cross subsidy between the 
classes of customers, and results in customers avoiding cost 
reflective pricing. (ERAA 2007:4)
The matter of equitable access to the benefits of competition and 
the potential pitfalls of deregulation for disadvantaged consumers 
and those imposing higher fixed costs on retailers was acknowl-
edged in the First Draft Report (AEMC 2007a) and has been a 
matter of advocacy and debate. The First Draft Report (AEMC 
2007a), however, fails to consider the potential benefits of current 
price regulation for these customers and instead discusses some 
policy options for mitigating the harm done to them by further 
deregulation.
Cross subsidisation in the energy market is a matter of public 
ethics and equity, not merely a matter of market efficiency or of 
the retailers’ best interests. Establishing the level of public support 
for price deregulation and its effects upon disadvantaged people 
should have played a role in the AEMC’s review. It had an opportu-
nity to do so within the parameters of research studies it commis-
sioned to inform its report.
In gathering the data underpinning the First Draft Report, the 
AEMC (2007a) commissioned two research surveys – a Retailer 
Study Research Report and a Consumer Research Report, both 
completed by Wallis Consulting of Melbourne. The Consumer 
Research surveyed 1000 domestic households and 500 businesses 
across Victoria ‘in order to assess consumer awareness, engage-
ment, experience and attitudes towards retail competition in the 
electricity and gas markets’ (AEMC 2007a:i).
The survey and its results were well structured and executed, with 
a high level of professionalism. The data gathered provided vital 
information for the AEMC review and added significantly to the 
weight of its conclusions. However, the consultants’ report did not 
investigate public perceptions of the set price tariff, nor its effects 
upon consumer behaviour. It did not inquire as to the understand-
ing of, or support for, the social equity and cross subsidy functions 
of price regulation. In this sense the report failed to consider a 
crucial dimension of the deregulation case.
Clearly another of Kraus’ rationales for regulation is apparent, that 
of public good –in this case the good of social equity.
Moral Hazard - Environmental Sustainability
The First Draft Report (AEMC 2007a) also failed to take future 
carbon constraints into account. The UK Stern (2007) report urges 
regulation of carbon emissions, with clear implications for carbon 
intensive energy generation. This will create significant change in 
the energy market, where the costs of transition must be borne 
by government, industry and citizens. Böhringer & Lange (2005) 
emphasise the importance of policy in this process:
Energy utilisation plays a central role in solving environmental 
problems and in implementing sustainable economies in the 
medium to long term. To promote the transition towards 
environmentally compatible energy systems, far-reaching 
policy measures are required. (Böhringer & Lange 2005:4)
Any changes to government set price controls must take account 
of the effect they will have on the ability of future governments 
to achieve equitable and effective transition to renewable energy 
infrastructure. For example, future governments may use price 
regulations to affect consumer behaviour, fund new infrastructure, 
or provide incentives for investing in domestic energy generation. 
Price regulation may be an important policy lever in reducing car-
bon emissions. While price controls may be used for this purpose, 
there is evidence to suggest that price deregulation may have the 
opposite effect. The First Draft Report (AEMC 2007a) found that:
[H]igh energy use customers who pay on time and in full are 
attractive to many retailers and marketing efforts may give 
priority, at least initially, to locations where households and 
small businesses best fit this profile. (AEMC 2007a:16)
Concentrating marketing efforts towards high income households 
will increase competition for this demographic, driving down 
prices. Add to this the dynamic of cost reflective pricing, and we 
can foresee a situation where households who consume more 
power pay relatively less for it. Where there is a collective interest 
in reducing consumption, this is a perverse outcome.
Deregulation will result in a situation where agents act in ways that 
incur environmental costs which they do not have to bear. This 
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qualifies as another of Kraus’ justifications for regulation, that of 
moral hazard.
The Costs of Regulation
Before concluding in favour of price regulation in light of Kraus’ 
principles, we must also consider the costs of regulation, the single 
argument advanced by the AEMC in favour of price deregulation.
The AEMC takes as its premise the orthodox neo-liberal assertion 
that regulation can impose costs and inefficiencies. The AEMC’s 
review argues:
regulated prices will almost always provide an imperfect 
substitute for those prices determined in a competitive 
market and are likely to impose costs and distortions not 
present in the competitive market. (AEMC 2007b:5)
While neo-liberal orthodoxy may compel this conclusion about 
abstract market efficiency, how much distortion do the regulations 
cause? A fair price may be described as one where the retailer is 
able to make a return on their investment commensurate with 
other investment opportunities (see AEMC 2007a). It appears that 
in Victoria the set price tariffs are in line with or above a fair price, 
at least in respect to wholesale electricity costs. This is evidenced 
by the First Draft Report’s (AEMC 2007a) finding that:
Margins available under the standing tariff, for electricity, 
appear not to have prevented efficient new entrants from 
being profitable at least when considered on average across 
all customers in a distributor’s service area. For gas, however 
the results at this stage indicate that the scope to offer 
discounts off the standing offer tariffs may have been more 
limited. (AEMC 2007a:138)
One of the arguments against the set price tariffs is that they may 
constrict margins to the extent that they prevent the access of new 
entrants to the market. The absence of new entrants will lessen 
the competitive discipline on other retailers. This is a due concern, 
yet given the First Draft Report’s (AEMC 2007a) above findings, 
and the state government’s demonstrated willingness to increase 
set retail prices along with wholesale costs (Batchelor 2007), there 
does not seem to be grounds for concern. The AEMC’s (2007b) 
Second Draft Report notes only one retailer reporting difficulty 
within margins at the time.
There was nevertheless considerable support among retailers for 
price deregulation (see AEMC 2007a). We may speculate that this 
support arose from retailers’ motive to maximise their profits rather 
than a concern for the effectiveness of market competition.
Lifeline Cap and Bounded Market Pricing
The AEMC’s proposal for deregulation of standing tariffs is not the 
only model. Dufty (2007) proposes a ‘lifeline’ price cap, where a 
regulated price for a quota of electricity is set commensurate with a 
minimal household usage and a fair price for retailers. Prices above 
this cap would be subject to full retail competition.
This is a compromise proposal. On the positive side, the energy 
charged within the capped rate avoids all the bounded rationality, 
information asymmetry, public good and moral hazard problems 
of full price deregulation, while providing the efficiencies and 
disciplines of the market above the capped rate. On the negative 
side, it involves the imperfect pricing, costs and inefficiencies of 
regulation below the capped rate, and falls foul of the informa-
tion asymmetry, transaction costs, social equity and moral hazard 
problems above the cap.
Where this proposal gains its strength is in its protection of and 
reward for those households who consume smaller amounts of 
electricity; those on low incomes and/or those with sound environ-
mental practices. Protecting these households from being punished 
by the market for their unprofitable custom must be a high priority 
for government regulators.
Conclusions
The debate around Victoria’s energy market price regulation dem-
onstrates the erroneous nature of claims that only free markets are 
efficient, effective and in the public interest. Dogmatic adherence 
to the ‘effective competition view’ is not sustainable in the light 
of the evidence in the Victorian context. The AEMC has taken the 
evidence of effective competition as sufficient reason to deregulate 
prices, but we have argued that the likely impacts of deregulation 
must also be considered.
The sole argument in favour of deregulation is the cost imposed 
upon the market by regulation. We have shown that in Victoria 
the regulated price did not hold prices below a fair return on 
investment for the retailers, and that these regulations also fostered 
greater competition in the market through greater price transpar-
ency and consumer comparison. We have also shown that there 
are a number of costs associated with deregulation.
Deregulation will increase the benefits of incumbency and dampen 
competition, particularly for low consumption households. Price 
deregulation will result in low consumption households paying a 
higher rate for their energy than high consumption households, 
eroding social equity by shifting a greater burden to disadvantaged 
people. Deregulation is also likely to erode efforts to curb carbon 
emissions as it leads to cheaper prices for higher consumption 
levels and higher prices for lower consumption.
Regulatory policy must consider more than the effectiveness of 
competition. Kraus outlines a suite of reasons for regulation, a 
number of which are apparent in the retail energy market – bound-
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ed rationality (choice and competition), information asymmetry 
(consumer protection), public goods (social equity) and moral 
hazard (environmental sustainability).
Dufty’s proposal for the ‘lifeline cap’ of an energy quota at a fixed 
rate, with a market rate beyond the cap protects low energy con-
sumption households from being punished by the market place for 
their unprofitable custom.
More broadly, it is evident that the success of privatisation of 
public utilities depends partly on new and innovative regulatory re-
gimes. Regulations need to capitalise on the efficiencies of private 
companies and market discipline while coercing market operators 
to serve the public interest. Claims that effective competition alone 
will sufficiently provide for the public interest are too simplistic, 
and in the light of the evidence, not sustainable.
Endnotes
1. Rhonda Smith is a former Commissioner with the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission and has published extensively on 
competition law and consumer protection.
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